$INR 拥有80%的上涨空间,且目前做空比例高达83%
$INR做空比例达83%,估值极低且收购后产量强劲增长,具备巨大逼空潜力。
- 极低的估值指标(P/E 4.4,远期 P/E 3)伴随收入大幅增长。
- 极小的流通盘和83%的做空比例带来巨大的逼空潜力。
- 收购 Antero 后运营强劲增长且储量寿命充足。
- 大量低于现货价格的石油互换义务限制了潜在的利润上涨空间。
- 5.5亿美元利率为7.625%的高级票据和较高的 EV/EBITDA 增加了财务风险。
Infinity Natural Resources 是一家专注于阿巴拉契亚盆地的独立油气生产商,主要业务集中在俄亥俄州东部的尤蒂卡页岩以及宾夕法尼亚州西南部的马尔塞勒斯/尤蒂卡干气资产。他们刚刚完成对 Antero 的收购,以完善其上游和中游资产布局,整体产量同比增长 88%(其中液化天然气产量同比飙升 159%)。
真正有趣的是其股权结构。截至第一季度,公司流通着 1875 万股 A 类股和 4478 万股 B 类股。然而,Finviz 和 MarketWatch 显示的公众流通股仅为 293 万股,其中 243 万股被做空。这意味着空头占比高达 83%。但这只是谜题的一部分。
公司的财务状况相当稳健。市盈率约 4.4,远期市盈率约为 3,市盈增长比约 0.11,股价/销售额约为 1.9,股价/账面价值约为 1.3。虽然其企业价值/息税折旧摊销前利润(EV/EBITDA)略高于整个油气勘探与生产(E&P)行业平均水平,达到约 8,但这很可能是由于近期收购带来的企业估值上升,且这些新资产的贡献尚未完全计入最近十二个月(TTM)数据所致。至于债务方面,公司持有 5.5 亿美元、利率为 7.625%、将于 2031 年到期的高级票据。考虑到其收入已从 2025 年第一季度的 8520 万美元跃升至 2026 年第一季度的 1.549 亿美元,这笔债务并不算重。这些收购正在开始产生回报。当然,并非一切顺利——公司仍有一些低于现货价格的原油互换义务,但这仅限制了利润空间,约占其原油产量的 56%。不过,目前其液化天然气(LNG)互换价格高于现货,反而降低了潜在的衍生品亏损风险。
公司的储量状况也相当健康。已报告的总探明储量达 2.24989 亿桶油当量(MMBoe),其中近一半为已开发储量。根据 2025 年的产量水平,这相当于 17 年的储量寿命;但由于产量正在快速提升,实际储量寿命更可能在 10 年左右。需要注意的是,部分储量数据是在收购 Antero 之前确定的,而 2026 年的产量数据已包含新运营资产的贡献,因此还需进一步调整。
分析师们普遍持积极看法。尽管部分评级因收购而被下调至“买入”(原为“强烈买入”),因为华尔街仍在观望其如何应对扩张期的挑战,但总体仍维持“买入并持有”评级,仅有一次下调至“卖出”。共识目标价集中在 22 至 24 美元之间,意味着有 70% 到 85% 的上行空间。
该股票近期遭遇了不必要的抛压,较 52 周高点下跌约 35%,目前交易价格低于 20 日、50 日和 200 日移动平均线。内部人士已经注意到这一点,并在过去三个月内大量买入。四位董事已在公开市场累计买入 14.75 万股,平均成本为 13.30 美元。一个需要注意的例外是,首席财务官于今年三月以 17 美元的价格出售了 27.5 万股股份,但当时正值 B 类股转 A 类股之后,因此可能是出于流动性或资产配置需求的正常操作。
说到高管团队,公司高层拥有丰富的油气行业经验。CEO 曾任职于切萨皮克能源(Chesapeake)和雪佛龙(Chevron)。CFO 出身于 Tudor Pickering Holt。而董事长?他曾共同创立 RSP Permian,该公司在合并 Concho 后被康菲石油(ConocoPhillips)收购。这些人确实懂得如何打造油气企业。
那么,什么将真正推动股价?下一次财报发布日期为 8 月 10 日。届时我们应能更清晰地了解收购整合进展及其对整体运营的影响。如果第二季度能展现出强劲的产量、良好的实现价格、可控的资本支出、指引维持或上调,且衍生品带来的 GAAP 混乱减少,我预计股价将迅速向分析师目标价靠拢。此外,公司还拥有 7500 万美元的股票回购授权,大部分额度仍待使用。若管理层采取更积极的回购策略,将形成支撑底线,并进一步收紧流通股规模。
风险提示
- 流通股计算和股权结构有些复杂。Finviz 和 MarketWatch 显示空头占比 83%,但 Fintel 数据显示仅为 11%(尽管 Fintel 尚未更新最新空头数据)。同时,公司还有大量 B 类股未来将影响流通量。
- 期权流动性较差。买卖价差极宽,交易活动稀少。这更适合“买入并持有”,而非短线交易。
- 4.5 亿至 5 亿美元的开发资本支出是一笔大额投入。若钻井表现不佳、成本上升或油价走弱,自由现金流将受到严重冲击。
- 第一季度出现了 6500 万美元的衍生品亏损。对冲虽可降低风险,但也限制了上行空间。若大宗商品价格暴涨,而对冲标记值反向变动,即使运营状况良好,GAAP 盈利也可能难看。
- 本质仍是商品定价问题。若原油和液化天然气价格下跌,其对冲保护空间有限,一旦收入或利润下滑到一定程度,债务问题将变得令人担忧。
我认为,从根本上说,该股下行空间有限,但上涨潜力巨大。当前市场并不青睐油气板块,但当人工智能热潮退去,或到了为数据中心供电的关键时刻,液化天然气将随时准备登场。
持仓情况:2000 股,均价 12.80 美元,另持有一些将在财报前后到期的期权。
That 83% is off the \~3M public float, but there are 60M+ shares total once you count the Class B. So the shorts are only a few percent of the whole company. I'd read that as a thin float more than people betting against them, especially with the wide spreads and thin options you highlighted.
Class B's can't be used to cover shorts right now and are held by legacy owners. They could theoretically hit the market at any time and be sold to cover shorts, but it wouldn't be immediate and there's not a ton of reason for insiders to start conversions. There's 18.75M Class A's, 90% of which are institutionally owned leading to the tiny public float.
Fair, and that fits how I read it. The number of shares that actually trade is small, which is why I see the 83% as a sign of a thin float, not a lot of people betting against the company. But it works both ways. If the price jumped, those legacy Class B holders would have good reason to convert their shares and sell, and that selling would cap how far a squeeze could run.
Possibly but the company is majority owned by two firms. They likely wouldn’t flood the market with shares and risk driving the price down.
Do you have a price target or entry
Is is just me or has this company basically never had positive free cash flow?
I'm not all shade because Gemini really does think this is cheap on a dcf basis. But it's hard to reconcile that with the cash flow.
Their operating cash flow has been increasing roughly 70% YoY, but capex has been high as they grow their footprint and output capacity.
Damn you!
I haven't made a trade in two weeks because I'm trying to let my 4 yolos cook. Now I may have to break that streak and dip my toe here, now who gets sold? Dawson's Creek moment over the weekend.
Good find.
The August and September calls have low volume/liquidity but they’re also cheap.
I've been watching INR due to the remarkably forward P/E and EV/annualized Q1 revenue (2.10, fairly good for E&Ps). Yahoo finance has different share data:
Yahoo Finance data for 6/15/2026
Shares Outstanding 18.75M
Float 16.38M
Shares Short 2.43M
Short Ratio 5.37
Short % of Float 13.25%
Short % of Shares Outstanding 12.97%
As far as I can tell from the last SEC report, all earnings and losses go to Class A shareholders. Class B shareholders, the legacy owners, are just beneficiaries of a tax receivables agreement that entitles them to
85% of the net cash savings, if any, in U.S. federal, state and local income tax that we (a) actually realize with respect to taxable periods ending after the IPO or (b) are deemed to realize in the event of a change of control... or the TRA terminates early..., in each case, as a result of (i) the tax basis increases resulting from the exchange of INR Units and the corresponding surrender of an equivalent number of shares of Class B common stock by the Legacy Owners for a number of shares of Class A common stock on a one-for-one basis.
If I'm interpreting this correctly, it seems the Class B shares are a means of deferring capital gains taxes for the legacy owners, but as they're exchangeable on a 1-for-1 basis for class A shares, the true fully diluted share count is 60.8 M shares. If that's case, not a value at all.
It comes down to whether to count institutional owners as part of the public float. Finviz and MarketWatch do not.
Since IPO, only about 850K Class B's have been converted. The largest owners are Pearl and NGP who are currently sitting on roughly 58% gains (they owned 98% of the company pre-IPO). That's not bad, but also probably a lot lower than what they're aiming for, especially since INR is still in its growth phase. Plus, they wouldn't flood the market and reduce their remaining stakes since liquidity is low. I don't see a situation where the public float is meaningfully impacted in the near term.
I see where I went wrong. The Class B and the preferred are already included in the EV calculation, so while profit/loss per Class A share give a distorted picture, metrics like EV/revenue and EV/EBITDA are still sound.
Analysts' forward PE is at 3.07, but adjusting for total share count it should be 9.93.
Now that you figured it out what's your take on the valuation?

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